Activity #5: Documents regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis

Document 1

Castro had a powerful ally in Moscow: Nikita Kruschev, who promised to defend Cuba with Soviet arms. During the summer of 1962, the flow to Cuba of Soviet weapons--including nuclear missiles--increased greatly. President Kennedy responded with a warning that America woud not tolerate offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. Then, on October 14, photographs taken by American planes revealed Soviet missile bases in Cuba--and some contained missile ready to launch. They could reach US cities in minutes.

On October 22, Kennedy informed an anxious nation of the existence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba and of his plans to remove them. He made it clear that any missile attack from Cuba would trigger an all-out attack on the Soviet Union.

For the next six days, the world faced the terrifying possiblity of nuclear war.

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The crisis severely damaged Kruschev's prestige in the Soviet Union and the world. Kennedy did not escape criticism either. Some people criticized Kennedy for practicing brinkmanship when private talks might have resolved the crisis without the threat of nuclear war. Others believed he had passed up an ideal chance to invade Cuba and oust Casto. (It was learned in the 1990s that the CIA had underestimated the numbers of Soviet troops and nuclear weapons on the island.)

The effects of the crisis lasted long after the missiles had been removed. Many Cuban exiles blamed the Democrats for "losing Cuba" (a charge that Kennedy had earlier leveled at the Republicans) and switched their allegiance to the GOP. Meanwhile, Castro closed Cuba's doors to the exiles in November 1962 by banning all flights to and from Miami.

Danzer, Klor de Alva, Krieger, Wilson, and Woloch, 2008: The Americans: Reconstruction to the 21st Century (McDougal Littell).

October 23, 1962: U.S. Navy low-level photograph of Sagua la Grande Medium-Range Ballistic Missile site, Cuba. Photograph available at George Washington University National Security Archive (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/photos.htm).

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

...As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.


2. We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

...The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

...The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

/s/ John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union. Message from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m. Available from the Avalon Project, Yale Law School (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/msc_cuba095.asp).